Monkey, Cortex, Social, Time, Perception H ypotheses are presented on neural peculiarities of the monkey brain that distinguish monkeys from other mammals and man: -The unique' feature of cortical tissue is that it can be applied serially. It fulfils some require ments of a powerful visual system. -The richness of visual as compared to other signals has yielded a basis for recognizing the bodily similarity of oneself to conspecifics. A visuo/motor coupling trained on oneself but applied to conspecifics ("aping") evolved. -Long series of (generalized visuo/visual) computations feasible in a very large cortex would produce excessive delays that would not correspond to outer world delays. The new human solution to this is an "offline" system in which temporal relationships are described by excitation patterns. This gives rise to a rapid expansion of the cortex. -In humans, a "meaning" has to be attributed to the mutual (computational) relationships of excitation patterns in the offline system, by a reference to the corresponding relation ships that would be valid in the normal (online) system. "Perception" is a corollary o f this. -The offline treatment o f time, together with "aping", leads to new types of helping and other social interactions. -Monkeys may be compared to humans not using their offline system in the state o f "ab sent-mindedness". -Experimental approaches departing from excitation patterns are discussed.
The purpose of the conference "N atural O rgan isms, Artificial Organisms, and Their B rains" was not to present results, or overviews, but to discuss open questions. The present contribution is in this spirit.
I am concerned with four problems: (a) Brains of monkeys are studied because of their similarity to those of humans. It is my im pres sion that the differences to humans are not well delineated: monkeys are often implicitly assumed to be animals that lack human-like language but otherwise have the same but quantitatively less evolved faculties as humans.
If it is stated that a task is too difficult for a monkey the reasons for this are not clear.
(b) Progress in behavioural research frequently re veals that animals other than mammals, some of them having small brains, can show per formances that previously had been thought to require a highly evolved mammalian brain (see e.g. Giurfa and Menzel, 1997 ). The urgent question is then why the brains of mammals, in particular of those of primates, are so large. (c) Neurophysiological studies in mammals tend to reveal functions which one would expect in brains of widely varying types and sizes, such as sensorimotor integration, selectivity for stimulus features (that may or may not depend on reward training), or traces of memory. (d) The large mass of cortical tissue in primates contrasts with a lack of general specification of its role. So far no function is known, except for human language, that can only be achieved by cortical tissue. A collection of hypotheses on the neural nature of the monkey is presented here that is composed of six parts, concerning (1 ) vision, (2 ) "aping" (which is the faculty to copy an action of a conspecific without understanding its goal), (3) a general role of the cortex, (4) the processing of time, (5) differences to humans, and, as a conclusion, (6 ) the nature of the monkey. A section on experimental questions is appended.
Some of the hypotheses may not appear wellfounded, partly because they also contain state ments on what will not be found. Such statements are notoriously difficult to prove experimentally. Also, one should bear in mind that this is not an overview, nor is it a theory, but a proposal for dis cussion.
(1) Vision
An optically well-designed eye presents so much valuable information on many parallel channels to an organism that even a highly sophisticated brain cannot fully make use of it.
Often it is asserted that an animal not using available information does not need it. This is equivalent to pre dicting that the species to which the animal belongs will not evolve towards a better use of that information.
Large amounts of possibly relevant signals, con taining numerous internal correlations, and rela tionships to own movements, are available even from large distances. An immense world, largely absent for the other senses because either only events changing in time are signaled, or only short distances are covered, becomes accessible through the sense of vision.
Evolution has advanced primate vision beyond optokinetic and flow field analysis, and beyond vi sion by "type of object" (see below), making use of precise transform ations of visual signals when a far object is inspected from a close distance, when it is translated, rotated, deformed, illuminated, or partially hidden. The primate visual system pro vides efficient means of classification and general ization of object features and relationships to own behaviour, facilitating compact storage, and ena bling the animals to handle large amounts of asso ciations, first of all the completion of invisible back sides of objects. The latter procedure may com prise the establishment of an abstraction, or "com pound view" from several views of which some are incomplete (learning stage), and thereafter to deduce the entire compound view from one in complete view (application stage).
The stress of the description is on the efficient handling of the visual signals, but not on the sys tem being able to react to features, nor on lowlevel properties such as visual acuity. To illustrate the issue, humans can easily see every detail of a random dot pattern, but they cannot handle hun dreds of such patterns if their difference is only in the generating set of random numbers. For this type of picture, classifications, generalizations, as sociations, storage or retrieval cannot be orga nized efficiently by the hum an visual system. Simi larly, a bird can see the details of finger positions and skin wrinkles on the hand of a monkey but certainly it cannot organize the handling of hun dreds of such views.
Note that in the description the term "percep tion" does not occur. Perception is a process known to humans only introspectively, and it is experienced as if it was a process that has input signals but that may have no output at all. The hypothesis is that a monkey is perfectly able to see, to handle visual signals from a great variety of sources, to produce memory traces and to derive behaviour, but that no perception occurs. Point (5) will elaborate on this topic in more detail.
(2) "Aping"
This is the ability of visually copying the behavi our of conspecifics or even man. Its cerebral pre requisites are substantial.
In a first step, high-level object vision has to be applied to visible parts of the m onkey's own body, say, its hand. The total am ount of neuronal infor mation from one's own hand may to a large extent be visual if very accurate transform ation rules and numerous generalizations on hand deformations, finger positions and skin wrinkles are available from vision. A dditional informations (tactile, in ner tension signals, reactions to m otor commands) may then become a minority so that finally the majority of signals from one's own hand (namely the visual ones) become similar to those obtain able from a hand of a conspecific. With the ap pearance of monkeys, the nervous system can be gin to make use of the idea that the own hand is in a certain sense com parable to that of a conspe cific. The hypothesis is that the excellent ability to complete partially visible objects finally enables a monkey to make use of the fact that it is bodily similar to its conspecifics.
does not require to make use of the similarity o f oneself to one's conspecifics.
A nother prerequisite of "aping" is to be able to establish a "backwards" link between the visual consequences of an action done by oneself, and the m otor commands used for that purpose. N or mally one first generates m otor commands, and then one may observe the results on one's own body. Now the visible results are required as pri mary events. Therefore they must be associated with some delayed m otor commands so that later, upon appropriate visual input, the associated m o tor commands can be retrieved. Possibly sensory feedback from motor output (joint receptors, mus cle spindles) play a role. This system is similar to the parrot's audition-and-voice association device. The outcome is a visual representation of one's own m otor commands. The hypothesis is that monkeys have such a representation. There are some neurophysiological hints to this (Hyvärinen, 1982; Di Pellegrino et al., 1992; Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998) .
The sequence of steps in an actual act of aping are as follows. In the case of "aping" of the open ing of a water tap, the first step is the observation of a conspecific or a human turning the handle, and the water jet appearing. Since "aping" usually is not intended to occur synchronously with the original act done by someone else, the animal im mediately has to associate the tap with the visually observed acting individual, by an appropriate al teration of transmission efficiencies of Hebbian synapses.
In such a situation there are no repeated events, but the animal knows during or shortly after the event that it was relevant. The hypothesis (not limited to monkeys) is that very generally, upon a fulfilment of a Hebbian condition, synaptic strengths are altered rather strongly so that a single such event would be sufficient for durable storage. However, if nothing else happens, the strong alterations would fade to a weak value which would need several repetitions to be strong enough for a memory trace to be retrievable. In contrast to this, in a case as above the knowledge of the relevance of an event would be used to trigger a mechanism of arresting that decay, so that a single event can be stored permanantly. The rather unspecific control signal ("the observed event was relevant") is available within som e 100 ms, and may often be pre pared even before an action. This could be a role of widespread brain stem afferents to the cortex (see M. Koch, 1998 : this issue, pp. 5 9 3 -5 9 8 ).
Later, when the animal proceeds to the copying action it will only see the water tap. The hypothe sis is that its visual association memory has first to complete the visually observed action of the now absent conspecific (in a similar way as completing a back side of an object), and thereupon that visu ally represented m otor act has to be translated into real m otor signals, by the newly developed visuomotor association system. "Aping" in monkeys is not judged to be impres sive by many observers. This seems partly due to an underestimation of the difficulties inherent in this process, and also due to the rapidity of m on key movements (for the brevity of the actions see also below). After a human has used a tool, and then leaves it behind, a monkey having access to the site would take it, handle it for less than a second, and then abandon it.
The hypothesis is that this type of activity, al though rarely impressive, can already provide the animal with a bias to segregate im portant actions and objects from chance observations. The advan tage is that the animal needs neither understand the purpose of the action, nor learn itself by re peated experience. When the animal, by virtue of "aping", is able to recreate the same circumstances (with itself as the acting individual) as the ones observed with another individual, then the chance is highly increased that it will grasp the usefulness of the action. What is needed, however, is to have some judgment of whether the actions of a partic ular conspecific or human are generally worth to be retained. Possibly this is a role of monkey rank order.
(3) Cortex
All animals have constructed neuronal networks for individual purposes, and construction pro cedures have evolved which can multiply the ele mentary processing unit in lateral directions: there are numerous examples of layered structures, such as the retina, which locally perform the same par allel signal processing.
However, most animals did not solve the corre sponding serial problem: The signals leaving the retina cannot reasonably be processed again by another retinal network.
The hypothesis (not limited to primates) is that the cortex is an elementary neuronal network, com posed of modules, or columns, whose essential ad vantage is that it can be applied serially. It can also be applied in parallel but this property is not new.
In this sense the cortical module is the re-invention of the neuron on the network level. In a con vergent way the neuron can receive signals from many other neurons and, in a divergent way, it can send them to many further neurons which in prin ciple can be built according to identical construc tion principles. There may be sub-varieties of neu ron types which, however, still are considered as neurons. The connectivity between neurons can be altered by Hebb-like processes. There may be con nection rules such as that certain inhibitory synap tic inputs term inate on the soma. The performance of a single neuron (as com pared to a brain) is not very sophisticated. It may be described as a corre lation detector or an integrate-and-fire device.
The last paragraph can be translated in a rather stereotyped way to apply to a cortical module in stead of a neuron:
The cortical module can in a convergent way re ceive signals from many other cortical modules and, in a divergent way, send them to many m od ules which in principle can be built according to identical construction principles (see also Puccetti and Dykes, 1978; Roe et al., 1992; Sur, 1993) . There may be subvarieties of module types, giving rise to different cortical areas, which, however, are all considered as cortex. The connectivity between modules can be altered by Hebb-like processes (there is, at present, no evidence of whether some "compound H ebb process" exists that operates on the level of entire modules). There may be con nection rules such as that certain layers preferen tially connect to certain neuronal structures (e. g., layer 5 connects to the brain stem and spinal cord). The perform ance of a single module (as compared to a brain) is not very sophisticated. It is a task of brain research to find a general description for this. It would not have to be in terms of sensory input or m otor output but it would rather have to link the direct inputs of a module to its outputs.
A tentative description (not a part o f the hypotheses), giving an idea of how it might look like, is as follows: Assum e that the number of cortical areas plus subcortical nuclei is N (between 20 and 1000). In ontogeny, se lect randomly som e small fraction of these (say, the square root of N) as input sources. Take fibre bundles from the selected areae and nuclei, and send them into a module of one particular cortical area. Later in life, when significant neuronal activity is available, that latter module would search for correlations between all the in puts, strenghten the corresponding endings, and possibly even add modules where there is much correlation. Still later in life, in an "application" stage, this piece of cortex is then able to classify incoming excitations by the nature and degree of correlation. Using the picture of neuronal assemblies, the latter step would correspond to the igni tion of an assembly. The output, depending among other things on the selection of fibre sources, is a classification result, and as such its overall information content is re duced, as compared to the incoming signals. The fibres carrying this output are then treated again as being one out of the above N types, and so on. Correlation and clas sification steps are concatenated, but by virtue of con vergence and divergence, each time the signals from other sources are involved. Expressed in another way, the cor tex is a machinery that can iteratively determine which ex citations belong to one Hebbian neural assembly.
The hypothesis is that the evolutionary advan tage of the cortex, in contrast to individually engi neered networks, is that an ever-increasing amount of cortical tissue can be built without subjecting this increase to Darwinian selection with respect to processing performance. Thus, if there are solu tions to secondary restrictions such as nutrition and space, then the cortex yields an advantage in evolutionary speed, and thereby flexibility, but not necessarily in absolute performance. Animals using individually tailored networks may solve the same problem s much more elegantly, and with much smaller brains, but for this they would need much longer time in evolution (and thereby they possibly do not come into existence).
Thus, I do not believe that the human cortical language areae are specifically designed for pro cessing language, but rather, that the use of general-purpose cortex, and of general routing rules, was the fastest way of meeting the then relevant evolutionary requirements. The reason for the in ability of monkeys to speak is not that they lack a language "centre" or area. Rather, a num ber of processing prerequisites (based on a visual system with greatly extended purposes; see below) are re quired before on top of all this a language process ing system can be installed. A great problem is to achieve a sufficient degree of data compression by providing for still more generalization and classifi cation steps. I believe that the selection of the out put channel (gestures, voice) is a m inor problem (see also Rizzolatti and Arbib, 1998) . However, to discuss this goes beyond the scope of the present contribution.
Stating that "a task is too difficult for a m onkey" is analogous to stating that a monkey cannot speak: it does not mean that the monkey lacks a "centre" for that task. Rather, the num ber of con catenation, convergence and divergence steps, and the intricacy of how the necessary connections have been shaped during the anim al's life, are in sufficient, so that classifications and generalisa tions cannot be pushed to the levels where higher common aspects emerge that are required for the solution of difficult problems. One of the limita tions is related to the processing of time treated below.
In some sense the cortex (and earlier in evolution, the neuron) is like money; it is always useful, before one knows precisely for what purpose it shall be spent.
(4) Processing of Time
The brain of every animal can cope with sensory and motor events that have to have an orderly temporal progression (see e.g. Gibbon et al., 1997) . The concatenation of brain events is "implicitly understood by the system" as that the events in the outer world happen at about the instant of oc currence of the accompanying excitation distribu tions. In other words, an animal "always lives in the presence". This does not mean that there is no dependeny on the past: memory of past experi ence optimally guides future bahaviour. It strongly influences which behaviour will follow a given pre sent sensory influence. However, an animal cannot reanimate a single past event into a neuronal exci tation pattern in order to derive new behavioural consequences from it. For this, a new actual ex perience has to be made. This is "online processing". One would describe it by saying how to do something. To know how to drink a coffee means that Hebbian synapses are set in such a way that the entire procedure (includ ing some bifurcations, to cope with variants) can be run with a minimum of "try and erro r". The synapse settings contain the ways to recognize a cup from the incoming sensory stream, and how to transform the stream stepwise to form adequate motor commands. However, there is no other way to run through such a sequence than by actually "doing it". The sequence stops if no cup is present. Also, there is no way to extract from the the syn apse settings what a "cup as such" is, i.e. other uses than drinking a coffee (e.g. return it upside down and use it as a candleholder) cannot be derived; for this, the cup has to be inspected anew.
An online-processing system as described, while it can derive future behaviour in an optimal way from a present situation, cannot generate predic tion in the proper sense which would be an excita tion distribution describing some future situation irrespective of one's own behavioural reactions. For a further consideration of prediction see below.
To avoid frequently encountered m isunder standings, it is reiterated here that an online sys tem is perfectly able to analyse temporally struc tured events and to generate temporally structured behaviour: if after some sensory input a very complex, time consuming com putation is required, the ensuing behaviour will be corre spondingly delayed. Online processing means that the event in the outer world giving rise to a sensa tion is assumed to take place about at the instant of the sensory excitations that are elicited. Simi larly, the consequences of an action in the outer world are assumed to take place at about the in stant of the m otor excitations, no m atter how large a delay might have been between the sensory and the motor events.
The hypothesis is that monkeys were the first to encounter cases where difficulties arose with this system: if a visual input triggers a lengthy com pu tation whose purpose is to complete some associ ated but invisible parts of the scene then the prob lem is that there is one initial "direct" excitation distribution, and much later another, calculated excitation pattern, but both refer to the same time in the outer world. It is obvious that such a prob lem of time reference must arise when from a sen sory input an excitation is computed which is equivalent to another sensory input. In contrast, even long lasting computations transforming sen sory signals into motor activity proceed without conflicts. In fact, one day's life is a continuous chain of neuronal computations in which the con tacts of the cerebral excitation distributions to the outer world via the sensory and m otor interfaces wax and wane.
The main hypothesis of the present contribution is that monkeys have no solution to the above problem of time reference arising with sensorysensory completion computations. Rather, like other animals, they have to limit the time spent for this type of computation to a time window that still allows to interpret direct and computed sen sory excitations as occurring simultaneously. I be lieve that the width of this window is of the order of 100 ms at best. The total durations of the excit ations involved may be longer than that, but when they are shifted in time against each other by more than the simultaneity window, a synchrony inter pretation would no longer be possible.
If an acceleration can be achieved by breaking down the com putations into several faster parallel processing branches (in different visual areas) then the problem can somewhat be alleviated. However, not every complex computing problem can be treated in this way.
Neurophysiological evidence for working mem ory may consist of a continuing neuronal excita tion after a stimulus has been extinguished, ena bling a trained animal to react with a delay of some seconds to a param eter (e.g., the locus) of the now invisible stimulus (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Fuster, 1998: this issue, pp. 670-676) . It might be argued that this is a counter-evidence to the above hypothesis, because it seems to indicate that the observed excitation refers to a past event in the outer world. This is certainly correct, but it is unlikely that the time of occurrence of the corresponding outer-world event is coded by that excitation pattern. At best it tells the rest of the brain that somehow there is no correspondence to a real, presently occurring outer-world event.
Obviously the task of completing a missing part of a visual scene becomes still more difficult if that part contains a relevant time structure. The hy pothesis is that for this reason monkeys have evolved the faculty (also present in human imag ery) to represent an observed action of a conspecific by a kind of motionless caricature, i.e. by re placing movement by typical positions. This can only work if the object (in general the conspecific) is sufficiently well known. Of course only short ac tions can be represented in this way, and the hy pothesis is that this is the reason why monkeys can only achieve the necessary completion calculations of rather brief aping actions.
It is im portant to realize that the completion of visual scenes is a process that can run in two direc tions: a back side can be completed from a front view, or vice versa. For this task, according to the above hypothesis, the cortex is particularly well suited since the general form at of its output is the same as that of its input. Otherwise cortex could not project to cortex.
A fundamentally different way of processing visual inform ation would be to associate one's own running around an object with first seeing its front side and then the back side, whereas running in the opposite direction shows the sides in reverse order. Then the time delay depends on running, and it is unlikely that the primate-like notion of "the object" could arise from this processing method. Rather, a notion of "type of object" (to which an odor, a taste, a texture, typical noises when touched, and individual experiences may be associated) would be combined to a location, and to the way how to get there.
(5) Differences to Humans
According to the hypotheses presented so far, monkeys have achieved to find a common format for the representation of both visual and (translated) m otor signals, and they have set the stage for translating everything in the brain to this format. They are specialists of applying visual completion com putations to data presented in this format. They do this by making extensive use of the general concatenation capabilities of the cor tex, up to the point where excessive processing times introduce problems of time reference.
Finding a solution to the latter problem would clear the way for a quasi unlimited use of cortical processing power, and a corresponding increase of cortical volume, provided that secondary restric tions can be overcome.
The hypothesis is that the essential evolutionary step from monkey to man is to have found that solution, which is to introduce the use of time tags that are associated to the excitation patterns to which they refer. These tags are excitation pat terns, too, and their significance is "explicit tim e", or some tem poral relationship, such as "yester day", or "valid for a long tim e". Upon that inven tion, indeed a rapid, until now unexplained expan sion of the cortex occurred.
Artificial chim panzee speech, besides other defects, lacks the elem ents of human language to indicate tem poral relationships (see e.g.. Pinker. 1994). In this re spect. apes seem to be closer to monkeys.
Obviously, if an explicit time tag is used, the old "implicit time rule" of each outer-world event oc curring simultaneously with the corresponding neuronal excitations (see above) can no longer be valid.
Therefore, from this evolutionary step on, two types of excitation had to be kept apart. For the ones the implicit time rule was valid, and they were used for online processing. For the others, the times of occurrence were determ ined by processing needs but had no significance in outer-world terms. The time (or time span) at which such an excitation had an outer-world significance was expressed by an associated time tag. It could point to a time in the past or in the future. The way of handling these ex citations corresponds to offline processing.
There is more to the two ways of processing than just a difference of treating time: for the first time in cerebral evolution, some kind of "signifi cance" had to be invented to differentiate between the roles of the excitation patterns as they oc curred in the offline system, including the (com pu tational) relationships to their predecessors and successors, and their "m eaning", i.e., the relation ships to predecessors and successors that they would have in the online system even if no such online process was actually run. The im portant de tail of this statem ent is the absence of a reference to the "outer world".
I have already referred to the example of the ob ject whose back side is deduced from the front view by a completion step, using a retrieval process from an association memory. In the offline system the back side is the consequence of the front side. How ever, the meaning of this is is an object in the outer world that has no constituents of which some are the causes, and others the effects.
The hypothesis is that "perception " is the attribu tion o f an "online meaning" to the result o f an o ff line computation applied to sensory signals. The most well-known effect of perception is that the time tag "valid for a long tim e" can be attributed to brief sensory excitation patterns, so that a con tinuous stable perception of the world can arise.
The question of the scientific nature of this attribution process cannot be addressed here. It may just be noted that the online system produces motor output whose ef fects are in the outer world, i.e. they are not identical with any process occurring in the brain. The offline sys tem produces "m eaning" which is not identical, neither, with any process occurring in the brain.
The hypothesis is that the greatest evolutionary pressure for a new way of handling time did not arise from pure visuo visual completion com puta tions but rather from those involving m otor acts and aping. Obviously it is an enormous advantage if a long sequence of actions, such as hunting deer, can be completely be time-tagged (for this, one has to attribute the tags while doing it oneself*) and then be stored in the same way as a "compound view" of an object. This stored knowledge can then be used when one observes a conspecific beginning to hunt. The continuation of the action can be com pleted by a computation which lasts much shorter than the actual online action of hunting. This is true prediction: it does not comprise own reactions to the result of the computation.
It is evident that the mechanisms involved in ap ing are prerequisites for this procedure, and that, as in aping, the whole offline computation is essen tially a sensory affair, with all m otor events being included in a translated sensory format. The way out of the offline system has already been pre pared in the monkey brain, but this cannot be treated here in detail. The final step must always be the online system which alone is able to directly produce real behaviour.
The hypothesis is that it is a new type of social interaction that humans have evolved by extend ing the mechanism underlying aping into the time domain, as it has been described above. The most notable new feature is that conspecifics have greatly extended the circumstances under which they can help each other. Here I am not concerned with altruism or egoism, but with the obvious pre requisite for any kind of helping, namely that (in the absence of speech) one must have some prior knowledge of the goal of the conspecific.
Beyond the primitive level of dem and to the ner vous system, namely to get recoverable traces of ex perience into its connectivity, the higher-level ques tion is how to generate these traces without actually having to collect that experience. The oldest solu tion is to inherit the appropriate connectivity. This is also the oldest basis of helping, present in many animals. Only after many generations such systems can adapt to new situations. A faster way is the ability of some animals to learn their roles in shared tasks which is also a kind of helping. However, both individuals have to be present dur ing the learning phase so that the buildup of the necessary knowledge can only occur under re stricted circumstances. These have to be arranged from the very beginning in such a way that the ability to help is the outcome. In contrast, the basis of the corresponding human ability is much wider: by applying the above procedure marked by *, humans can use own experience gathered with out the presence of a conspecific, and apply it to cases in which a conspecific takes the role of one self.
On the same basis, detrimental actions of a con specific can be prevented. Note that in such contexts tools have not only a value related to their use, but with the appearance of man they also gain a communicative value because they greatly facilitate the identification of the nature of an action intended by a conspecific. This may have accelerated the evolution of tool use as well as of language. Finally, what has evolved to be applied to conspecifics might later also have been applied ot oneself, giving rise to consciousness (MacKay, 1977) and intentionality.
It follows from the preceding paragraphs that there is a rule which is not obvious when pre sented in isolation. It states that there is a link between the use o f markers o f explicit time and a new type o f social interactions, namely to predict the actions of a conspecific. The reason for the existence of this link is that the attribution opera tion m arked by * can only be performed on one self, but not on external tem poral processes (such as observing the breaking of a dyke by a flood) because it also contains own m otor signals to which oneself has access. In contrast, there is no access to the way how the water organizes the forces it exerts on the dyke.
(6) Nature of the Monkey
The hypothesis is that monkeys depend exclu sively on an online-system. They live without con sciousness and perception, and yet they can per fectly see and act, in correspondence to the attem pts of descriptions as they are usually given by neurophysiologists (see König and Luksch, 1998: this issue, pp. 542-549) . They live always in the presence, and yet they can perfectly guide fu ture behaviour by experience accumulated in the past. They have evolved accurate object vision that allows them to exploit visual transform ation rules 606 and visual memory so that an object can be repre sented, and be recognized, by a kind of compound view including visible and hidden parts. The great weight of vision, in turn, gives rise to the ability of monkeys to recognize themselves as being physi cally similar to their conspecifics. On the basis of this a visual representation of m otor acts has been built up, leading to the faculty of aping, and to an extension of the above com pound views of objects to include actions that can be applied to them.
The hypothesis is that monkeys did not evolve a solution to the problem of time reference arising from long com putation times that may separate the times of occurrence of excitations belonging to visible and com pleted parts of a scene.
The com plem ent of this hypothesis is that the essential evolutionary step forward towards man is to have solved this problem by creating an offline processing system, using excitation patterns as time tags. This system, for which the m onkey's ap ing ability is a prerequisite, can be accommodated by a cortical system that is largely built according to the same principles as the one of monkeys. The main new feature is on the level of the significance of some of the excitations in that system: some of them signify "explicit tim e".
So far no hypothesis can be offered for the reason of only one offline system existing in man. If this system is working on a process, no other offline process can be run simultaneously.
Introspectively this may give rise to confusion because "sim ultaneously" does not refer to the times that are indicated by the time tags, but it refers to the times of occurrence of excitations in the brain.
If the offline system is busy with one problem, then the hypothesis is that only online processes can continue to operate. This situation arises e.g. while one does difficult m ental arithmetics, which can only be done in the offline system. While doing this, humans are said to be in a state of "ab sent-m indedness" with regard to all other activi ties except these arithmetics. It is well known that they continue to show a large variety of learned, highly structured sensory and m otor activities, such as dressing, eating a meal using cutlery, or walking along a complicated path in a building, switching on lights, and avoiding obstacles. How ever, they could neither speak, nor understand language, nor think, without prior interruption of the state of absentmindedness, i.e., the interrup tion of the arithmetics in this example.
The hypothesis is that the remaining human fac ulties reveal the performance of the isolated on line system. Therefore, humans in the state of "absent-mindedness" may be com pared to monkeys. This state is not well investigated, possibly because it has been viewed primarily as a state of degraded overall performance. However, an exploration might be worthwile because it might help to get an idea of how it is for a hum an brain to be the brain of a monkey.
I
guess that an absentminded human would learn a typical monkey training task in about the same time as a monkey, e.g. to touch a light whenever it lights up in green colour, but not when the colour is red.
Experimental Approaches
If the description that I have given of the m on key brain should prove incorrect in essential points, I believe that it is still correct in giving an idea of the minimum of functional complexity of the monkey brain, and possibly also on the nature of the conceptual entities appearing in it. In partic ular, when one tries to explain the behaviour on an animal, it is my impression that in the past too much weight has been given to "evolutionary niches" located in the outer world (such as advan tages of jumping from tree to tree) but the roles of "neural niches" (such as advantages of gaining access to the processing power of a larger cortex by finding a trick to handle certain conflicts arising from long computing times) are neglected.
Similarly, in neurophysiological investigations of the monkey brain too much weight is given to outer-world circumstances such as sensory stimuli or behavioural parameters. Usually, one tries to specify rigorously the outer world events, and col lects the accompanying neural events in an in discriminate way.
The type of result of the application of this "classical" method might be that some neurons re act to stimulus XI (or the excitations of some other neurons accompany m otor act X2) if the at tentional state is X3, with X I to X3 being entities of the outer world, the latter being defined in terms of some trained animal behaviour. The problem with this procedure is that repeated trials of such experiments usually yield variable results.
O ne resorts to averaging techniques, but there is no way to interpret the variations. The problems increase with the size of the investigated brain, and the farther away from the interfaces to the outer world the recordings are taken.
For large brains, the processing of the cerebral signal contents cannot be understood by solely considering the interactions with the interfaces. Rather, a "reverse m ethod" has to be applied in which the point of departure is similar for the ex perim enter and the animal: at the outset he/she has to be concerned with purely intracerebral op erations such as neuronal correlation detection, classification (i.e., "recognition"; Aertsen and Johannesma, 1981; Krüger and Becker, 1991; Becker and Krüger, 1996; Krüger, 1997) and detection of plasticity. When some well-defined (i.e., discriminable, and repeatedly recognizable) neural event is found, the experim enter has to search for corre lates to outer world events. Thus, while in both the classical and the reverse m ethod a search of correlations is performed between neural and outer world events, one shifts the variability, in which the most intriguing brain processes are hid den, from the neural to the outer world side. Aver aging over different outer world events will not always be applicable but there is the great advan tage of the everyday faculty of human observers to detect common aspects in outer world events that at first sight seem different.
It is often objected that this method lacks scientific rigor for two reasons. Firstly outer world parameters would have to be specified, to m eet standards of scien tific communication (see König and Luksch, 1998 : this issue, pp. 5 4 2 -5 4 9 ). It is true that the experimental p ro cedure has to specified, but this can also consist o f defin ing how one selects, and recognizes repeatedly, some spontaneously occurring excitation pattern.
Secondly, when such a selection has been done, it is obvious that it is unlikely that in a second animal a sim ilar pattern is observed, be it for the reason that an exci tation with the same significance has a different distribu tion, or be it that the second animal just does not produce that excitation. A firmly established predictabil ity of some (intracerebral or outer-world) event on the basis of the appearance of the primary excitation pattern can be a solid scientific result even when it is observed in only one animal. Rejecting the scientific value of such findings is equivalent to ignoring the central problem: brain research suffers from an enormous lack of physio logical phenomenology. Just as the anatomical entities in the brain have names, thousands of excitation distribu tions would have to be given names, even if they do not look alike in different animals, and then one has to find out what they mean. It is often forgotten that the animal can organize its life only by organizing the succession of cerebral events; for the animal, "the same situation" is given only when the cerebral events are the same, irre spective of similarities in the outer world.
The role of recognizing a cerebral event is il lustrated in the report of Murthy and Fetz (1992) . They unexpectedly observed large oscillatory local field potentials (LFPs) in the sensorimotor cortex of a monkey when it retrieved a raisin from the invisible closed fist of the experimenter. Since well-controllable outer world events known to be relevant in this area did not have this effect, no result at all would have been obtained if the neural event had not been recognizable by itself.
Together with V. Lamme in Amsterdam we have observed conspicious high-frequency oscillations of up to 70 Hz in area V I of monkeys, and the outer world correlate was found to be a coloured stimulus but also a negative emotional component (m anuscript in preparation). It is unlikely that anyone would have planned a "classical" experi ment where such an emotion were systematically generated in an animal, with the goal to study its influence on V I.
The experim enter applying the reverse method must observe similar cerebral events repeatedly. This is difficult for three reasons: Firstly, if there is no way to increase the likelihood of reappearance of a particular neural excitation pattern, one has to wait. Therefore, long-term recording conditions must be available. Secondly, the recognition of a neural pattern is the more reliable, the more indivi dual neural param eters are taken into account. Therefore, multivariate recordings have to be taken. Thirdly, even if many param eters are taken into account, it is still not known how small a frac tion of some true neural event one is observing.
O n the other hand, there is already progress with respect to data treatm ent, namely the seg m entation of the multivariate data stream, and thereafter, the classification, or recognition, of neural events (Radons et al., 1994; Becker and Krüger, 1996) . Unlike a large-amplitude oscilla tion, the general case of a repeating neural event will not be identifiable by eye.
We have contributed to diminish these difficul ties, by having developed long-term multielectrode recording techniques (Krüger, Spatz and Bondar, in preparation) , and m ethods for segmenting and classifying data thereby obtained.
The effect is a beneficial one for the monkeys: Events within the brain have to be fixed, i.e. to be re-identified while one has to collect whatever happens in the outer world. Obviously stereotyped stimulation and behaviour are not compatible with the reverse m ethod. Thus, shifting the requirem ent of strict definition of experim ental circumstances from the outer world (including behaviour) to the neural side, the experiments are no less rigorous, in principle, than classical ones, but the animals are less restricted.
Obviously there is a huge gap between the very complex presum ed neural constitution of the m on key and the relatively simple experimental meas ures taken so far to investigate it. The develop m ent of a general technique for repeatedly recognizing neural events is only a prerequisite, and even this is still a difficult procedure. How ever, the choice is clear: If we assume that the m onkey's brain is similar to that of man in some im portant respects, then the expenditures for fu ture experiments on monkeys have to be greatly augm ented, with respect to experimental and data evaluation m ethods as well as to fundamental con siderations. If not, it is better to study earthworms.
